Synchronization in Cycles of China and India During Recent Crises: A Markov Switching Analysis.

We study the impact of recent crisis episodes viz. the Great Recession of 2007-09, the Euro Area crisis of 2010-12 and the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020-21 on the Emerging Market Economies (EMEs) of China and India using data from January, 1986 till June, 2021. A Markov-switching (MS) analysis is applied to discern economy-specific cycles/regimes and common cycles/regimes in the growth rates of the economies. We apply the univariate MS Autoregressive (MS-AR) model to characterize country-specific negative growth, moderate growth and high growth regimes of China and India. We examine the extent of overlap of the identified regimes with the Great Recession, the Eurozone crisis, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Thereafter, we study the regimes depicting common phases in growth rates of China-India and China-India-US by using multivariate MS Vector Autoregressive (MS-VAR) models. The multivariate analysis shows the presence of common negative growth during the turbulent periods during the study period. These results can be explained by the existence of strong trade and financial linkages between the two EMEs and the Advanced economies. The pandemic triggered a recession in the Chinese, Indian and U.S. economies and its impact on growth is much worse than the Great Recession and the Eurozone crises.

Institutional Constraints and Liquidity Provision in the Eurozone Core and Periphery Before and After Crises: A Preliminary Comparison of the Eurozone Crisis and the Coronavirus Pandemic

This paper presents a preliminary comparison of the Eurosystem response to the Global Financial Crisis and Eurozone Crises with the onset of the Coronavirus Pandemic in 2020. It analyzes bank, national central bank (NCB), and government balance sheets to show the effect of ECB decisions to consrain or enable liquidity provision across the Eurozone, particularly along core and peripheral lines. It argues that these dynamics reflect Post-Keynesian theories of endogenous money, and the potential for monetary authorities to structurally influence liquidity preference and provision. As Eurozone governments debate whether to continue these practices, systemic liquidity crises that hurt financial and fiscal activity remain a risk at the time of writing.

Coronavirus and the social state: Austria in the pandemic

This chapter examines the chronology as well as the cause-and-effect of the evolution of the rule of law, state power, public health, and popular will in Austria. While some European Union (EU) states had enacted vaccine mandates for older residents, and other European countries required COVID-19 vaccines of health-care workers, Austria's more-or-less universal Impfpflicht for adults represented a new milestone in the EU amid the crises of the twenty-first century. In parliament as well as in the new and old media, the most prominent objectors to the vaccine mandate hailed from the populist nationalist-right Freedom Party of Austria. Starting in 2009, Austria faced its own share of the sovereign debt misery or eurozone crisis. Despite the Sturm, Drang, and sordid scandal of the last decade or so, Austria's Sozialstaat is neither down nor out. © 2023 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Financialization, Structural Power, and the Global Financial Crisis for Europe's Core and Periphery

In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), European governments intervened to support domestic financial systems;several years later, peripheral European economies were at greater risk of having domestic financial crises transform into fiscal crises. While mainstream economic thinking predicts financial markets will punish risky bank behavior with higher interest rates and punitive resolution measures, in fact, banks in core European economies, which engaged in riskier activity in the subprime mortgage market, faced preferential treatment in the aftermath of the GFC. This article argues that financialization, the increased structural economic power of financial institutions, increased the structural power of core members of the Eurozone to direct supranational policies after the GFC. It supports these claims with financial data from balance sheets for a sample of EU economies, as well as institutional analysis of the financial aspects of European integration, and the financial, monetary, and fiscal responses that followed the onset of the GFC. While banks in the Eurozone core were more likely to have engaged in risky behavior, they were more likely to receive liquidity assistance from monetary authorities like the Federal Reserve due to their activity in the US. As Eurozone governments consider how to respond to crises, such as the Covid-19 pandemic going forward, policies that more equitably support governments rescuing domestic financial actors should be considered in tandem with broader financial regulations of structurally important economic institutions.

Public diplomacy in an age of perpetual crisis: assessing the EU's strategic narratives through six crises

Purpose The purpose of this research is to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the EU's public diplomacy - towards both domestic and external audiences - during times of crisis. The EU's public diplomacy is examined across six major crises: the Eurozone crisis (2008), the Ukrainian crisis (2014), the migrant crisis (2015), the Brexit referendum (2016), the new transatlantic relationship (2017) and the COVID-19 pandemic (2019). The goal of examining these crises in conjunction is to derive policy-relevant insights. Design/methodology/approach This article adopts a problem-driven approach - the problem being how successful is the EU at public diplomacy during times of crisis - that draws theoretical and empirical insights from Communication Studies, International Relations and EU studies via a "strategic narratives" framework. It situates the EU as a unique public diplomacy actor, one which is becoming more prominent due to the mediatisation of diplomacy, especially driven by the advent of cyberspace. Findings The article finds that the EU has been experiencing a cycle of crises that have affected the political, economic, symbolic and social foundations of the common project. The EU has had some notable success - such as restoring confidence at the height of the Eurozone crisis - and some notable challenges - such as effectively combatting disinformation. Regardless, the EU has the potential to better manage these and future crises by engaging in an effective public diplomacy strategy that tells a shared European story that informs and inspires people, both domestically and externally. Originality/value The article offers an original examination of the EU's public diplomacy response to six different crises. It looks at different types of crises and utilises concepts from different social science perspectives. It offers novel strategic and policy recommendations.

The European Parliament in the Economic and Monetary Union after COVID: towards a slow empowerment?

The European Parliament (EP)'s role in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has always been rather limited. Its prerogatives were somewhat reinforced after the Euro crisis, but its role in policy implementation remained minimal. However, because of the pandemic, the level of integration at the supranational level has significantly increased as a result of, among others, the adoption of unique instruments such as the SURE instrument, Next Generation EU and the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RFF). This article considers to what extent the EP's role in EMU has been reinforced as a result of these measures. It finds that the EP was regrettably reserved only a limited role in the operationalisation of the RRF and an even lesser role in other instruments, but that legal and political constraints made any other outcome unlikely. This article argues in favour of an increased use of the existing instruments by both the EP and national parliaments, as well as a reinforcement of interparliamentary cooperation. A far more extensive empowerment of the EP would be required if temporary and exceptional developments that occurred in the EMU during the pandemic were to become more entrenched.

The European Union’s crises and the resilience of EU societies

Resilience is one of the most popular and yet ambiguous topics in the social sciences. It has been examined not only in an individual sense but also in relation to communities. The European Union (EU) has faced several crises in the 2000s that have shown the level of resilience of EU societies. This paper discusses community resilience within the framework of the EU’s recent crises to examine how EU societies have coped with adversity. Specifically, it analyses competences and common policies at the EU level in relation to resilience and crises within the EU. © 2022 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

European Institutions Acting Outside the EU Legal Order: The Impact of the Euro Crisis on the EU’s "Single Institutional Framework"

In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the EU and its Member States had to face very pragmatic issues: how to avoid the economic collapse of Greece, Portugal and Ireland? Decisions had to be taken quickly in any institutional or legal forum that was immediately available. For this specific reason, legal solutions entailing the conclusion of international agreements by some of the EU Member States outside the EU legal framework were taken as a new normal. Due to a close legal relationship between these new international treaties and the EU legal order, a decision was also taken to "borrow" already existing EU institutions and entrust them with new tasks. In this Article, we question the role of EU institutions outside the EU legal framework. We first address the evolution of the EU institutional framework in the context of the euro crisis in relation to art. 13 TEU and recital 7 of the TEU preamble and the requirement of "unity of the institutional framework". Section II shows that "borrowing" the EU institutions outside the EU legal framework does not seem to alter the nature of the single EU institutional setting. Section III questions whether the tasks entrusted to the EU institutions outside the EU legal framework do not undermine the existing institutional equilibrium within the EU legal order. Section IV addresses the EU response to the Covid-19 pandemic from an institutional perspective as raising similar concerns within the EU legal order. The last section concludes.